客户参与影响创新不确定下的研发外包合同  

R&D Outsourcing Contract under Innovation Uncertainty Due to Customer Participation

作　　者：宋寒[1] 但斌[1,2] 张旭梅[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院 [2]现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆400044

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第3期295-301,共7页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272086,70871128);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-10-0884)

摘　　要：研发具有创新不确定的特点,客户参与外包的研发项目能使服务商进一步明确研发目的、降低创新的不确定性,但传统的研发外包合同忽略了客户参与对创新不确定的影响。考虑客户参与对创新不确定的影响下,建立了客户参与下的委托代理模型,分析了客户参与和收益共享合同参数的内在逻辑关系,并通过模型求解进一步分析了外生变量对最优收益共享激励系数及客户最优参与度的影响。研究表明:随着客户参与度的增加,与之匹配的收益共享激励系数也应增加;服务商风险厌恶度与客户最优参与度之间并非单调关系;客户最优参与度和最优收益共享系数都与双方成本系数负相关,与产出系数正相关。Customer participation in R＆D outsourcing projects may help clarify objective of R＆D projects and reduce innovation uncertainty in R＆D. Traditional R＆D outsourcing contracts ignores the effect of customer participation on innovation uncertainty. We build a principal-agent model considering the effect. Using this model, the logical relationship between the customer participation and revenue sharing contract parameters is analyzed. The effect of exogenous variables on the optimal revenue-sharing incentive coefficient and the best customer participation is studied. The analysis demonstrates that the revenue-sharing incentive coefficient should increase with the increase of customer participation, there is not a monotonic relationship between the risk aversion of service provider and customer participation, the optimal revenue-sharing incentive coefficient and the best customer participation are positively related to output coefficient, and negatively related to cost coefficient.

关 键 词：研发外包 客户参与 收益共享 道德风险 激励机制 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]