基于竞争博弈的并购DCF价值评估方法优化研究  

Improvement DCF for Mergers and Acquisitions Based on Competitive Game

作　　者：刘洪久[1,2] 马卫民[2] 胡彦蓉[1] 

机构地区：[1]常熟理工学院管理学院,江苏常熟215500 [2]同济大学经济与管理学院,上海200092

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2013年第3期366-370,共5页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70671004;71071113);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2010SJB790001)

摘　　要：价值评估是并购决策的关键环节,合理的评估方法有助于并购决策的科学性。并购的价值评估既要考虑并购的协同效应,又要考虑并购后市场竞争结构变化的影响。以博特兰徳模型描述并购后的市场竞争态势,推导出两企业和n个企业条件下市场竞争博弈的纳什均衡,并将均衡结果与贴现现金流理论进行有机结合,修正了传统理论可能存在的问题,有利于企业更好地进行并购决策。Valuation is the core of decision in mergers and acquisitions. Reasonable methods for valuation make the decision making process more scientifically. We consider the synergistic effect as well as the change of market structure after mergers and acquisitions. We uses Bertrand model to describe the market competition. Nash equilibriums of two companies and n companies are deducted by combining discounted cash flow model. The improvement amends the problems of classical theory and help enterprises execute the strategy of mergers and acquisitions.

关 键 词：竞争博弈 并购 现金流量折现 价值评估 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]