高管薪酬粘性增加了企业投资吗?  

Does the Stickiness of Executive Compensation Increase Corporate Investments?

作　　者：步丹璐[1] 文彩虹[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,四川成都611130

出　　处：《财经研究》2013年第6期63-72,共10页Journal of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年项目(71002111);教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09XJC630012);西南财经大学"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"(JBK13031)

摘　　要：文章利用我国上市公司2006-2010年的高管薪酬和公司业绩数据,考察了高管薪酬粘性对上市公司投资的影响。研究发现,高管薪酬粘性越大,公司重奖轻罚越严重,高管的冒险精神就越强,从而越可能新增投资。同时,这种正向影响在国有企业比在民营企业以及在地方政府控股企业比在中央政府控股企业更加显著,说明2004年以来国资委有关央企负责人薪酬的规定以及有关投资规模的规定起到了一定作用。文章为高管薪酬机制的设计提供了一定的理论依据和经验证据。This paper analyzes the effects of the stickiness of executive compensation on investments in listed companies based on the data of execu- tive compensation and performance of Chinese listed companies from 2006 to 2010. It concludes that greater stickiness of executive compensation leads to more seriously ample rewards and light punishment, stronger risk-taking spirit, and thereby more new investments. And this positive effect is more significant in state-owned firms and local-government-controlled firms com- pared to private firms and central-government-controlled firms respectively, showing that rules concerning executive compensation in state-owned enter- prises supervised and managed by the central government and investment scale issued by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commis- sion of the State Council have played a certain role since 2004. This paper provides some certain theoretical and empirical evidence for the design of ex- ecutive compensation mechanism.

关 键 词：高管薪酬粘性 冒险精神 新增投资 产权性质 

分 类 号：F275.5[经济管理—企业管理]