董事会监管下的高管变更对盈余管理的影响研究  

Study on the Relationship between Top Management Turnover and Earnings Management with Management of Board

作　　者：周晖[1] 左鑫[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2013年第3期79-83,共5页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：湖南省教育科学"十二五"规划2012年度立项课题资助项目(湘教科规通[2012]009号)

摘　　要：以我国上市公司为样本,对董事会监管下高管变更带来的盈余管理行为进行研究。实证结果表明:高管变更当年存在调减盈余行为;董事会监管程度与高管变更的概率有相关关系;董事会监管能抑制高管变更时的盈余管理行为。因此,我国上市公司应注重董事会制度建设,强化董事会监管作用,以规范盈余管理行为,促进我国上市公司健康、有效的发展。The earning management after the top management turnover occurs has been researched taking China＇s listed companies as samples.The empirical results show that： in the year when top management turnover happens earnings tend to reduce;and supervisory degree is related with the possibility of top management turnover;and the earnings tend to be under control with the management of board.Therefore,to promote the healthy and effective development of China＇s listed companies,attentions should be focused on the development of board system and the standardization of earning management behaviors.

关 键 词：董事会监管 高管变更 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]