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机构地区:[1]上海海事大学经济管理学院,上海201306 [2]上海交通大学中美物流研究院,上海200030
出 处:《管理科学学报》2013年第5期83-94,共12页Journal of Management Sciences in China
基 金:国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70432001)
摘 要:针对承担货运和客运且通过不同辖区的港口集疏运通道,每个腹地区域独立进行所辖通道的投资规模决策和拥挤收费策略,基于多车型换算系数构建港口集疏运通道的客货运输均衡和腹地区域福利模型,并采用逆向归纳法进行两阶段非合作博弈分析.研究发现:实施差别拥挤收费策略对港口货运收费最高,而统一拥挤收费策略对腹地客运收费最高;实施各种拥挤收费策略后港口集疏运通道的投资规模均呈下降趋势,且只对货运车辆实施拥挤收费策略时通道投资的规模最低.通过数值算例并以拥挤收费前作为参照,对比分析港口集疏运通道客货运结构对均衡投资规模和拥挤收费以及腹地区域福利和通道总福利的影响.For port collecting and distributing corridor conveying cargos and passengers through different hin- terland regions, different regions make independent decisions regarding the investment scale and congestion pricing of the corridor under the jurisdiction. A traffic equilibrium and hinterland regional welfare model are constructed based on the traffic equivalent coefficient of port cargos and hinterland passengers, using a two- stage non-cooperative game where both regions strategically set investment scales in the first stage and play a pricing game in the second stage. Inspiring results are obtained: the maximum tolls of cargos and hinterland passengers respectively are the strategies of the differentiation and uniform congestion pricing ; corridor invest- ment scales are continuously decreasing after implementing the congestion pricing, among which the minimum investment scale is under the strategy of port cargo transit tolls only. Finally, the numerical analysis illustrates some theoretical insights and, compared with the situation where there is no toll equilibrium, the effects of the traffic structures of cargos and passengers on the equilibrium corridor investment scale, the congestion price as well as the welfare of the hinterland regions combining the traffic structure of the corridor are analyzed.
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