监事与独立董事激励对两类代理成本影响的实证研究  

The Empirical Studies of the Effects on Incentive of Supervisors and Independent Directors to the Two Types of Agency Costs

作　　者：扈文秀[1] 介迎疆[1,2] 侯于默[3] 李簪[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054 [2]西安工业大学经济管理学院,陕西西安710032 [3]西安交通大学电信学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《预测》2013年第3期46-50,共5页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973096);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20096118110010);陕西省普通高等学校哲学社会科学特色学科建设资助项目;西安工业大学科研创新团队建设计划资助项目;西安工业大学校长基金资助项目(XAGDXJJ1224)

摘　　要：目前监事和独立董事被排除在上市公司股权激励对象之外,但仍有学者认为对监事和独立董事实施股权激励能有效降低代理成本。基于此,作者获取2009～2011年479家上市公司的1437个平衡面板数据,建立多元回归模型,分析了在公司治理因素交互作用下监事激励和独立董事激励对两类代理成本的影响。研究发现,在考虑公司治理因素的交互作用时,监事和独立董事激励在两类代理问题中均未能发挥治理作用。最后在肯定激励必要性的前提下,从薪酬制定和声誉方面提出提高激励效果的建议。Supervisors and independent directors are outside of the listed company equity incentive object,but there are still scholars believe that the implementation of equity incentive for supervisors and independent directors can effectively reduce agency costs.Based on this,the authors obtain 1437 balanced panel data of 479 listed companies from 2009 to 2011,building a multiple regression model,analyzing the effects on incentive of supervisors and independent directors to the two types of agency costs under the interaction of the corporate governance factors.The study found that the incentives of supervisors and independent directors failed to play a role of governance in the two types of agency problem considering the interaction of the corporate governance factors.Finally,under the premise of the necessity for motivate,we put forward some suggestion to improve the incentive effect from the remuneration and reputation.

关 键 词：监事激励 独立董事激励 代理成本 平衡面板数据 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]