零售商公平关切下闭环供应链定价策略研究  

Pricing strategy of considering retailer's fairness concerns in the closed-loop supply chain

作　　者：张克勇[1] 吴燕[1] 侯世旺[2] 

机构地区：[1]中北大学经济与管理学院,山西太原030051 [2]中北大学机械工程与自动化学院,山西太原030051

出　　处：《山东大学学报（理学版）》2013年第5期83-91,共9页Journal of Shandong University(Natural Science)

基　　金：中国博士后科学基金资助项目(2011M501272);中北大学校科学基金资助项目(2011-56)

摘　　要：把零售商公平关切行为倾向引入到闭环供应链的定价决策中,分别针对制造商考虑和不考虑零售商公平关切性两种不同情形构建了相应定价决策模型,利用博弈理论对模型进行分析求解。研究表明零售商的公平关切行为倾向对零售商和制造商的定价决策、利润以及废旧产品的回收量均具有影响;当零售商具有公平关切时,制造商考虑零售商的这种公平关切行为参与博弈有利于自身利润的提高,并增加闭环供应链系统废旧产品的回收量,有利于资源回收利用和环境保护;同时还发现公平关切行为倾向是零售商获取闭环供应链利润分配的一种有效手段。The price strategies of the closed-loop supply chain for considering fairness concerns behavior were studied,and two different price models were constructed under two different situations in which the manufacturer considers retailer＇s behavior of fairness concerns or the manufacturer doesn＇t consider retailer＇s behavior of fairness concerns.The price models were analyzed by game theory.The results shows that the retailer＇s fairness concerns behavior tendencies affect the price strategies and profit of the retailer and manufacturer,and the recycling quantity of waste products.The manufacturer makes more benefits when he considers the retailer＇s behavior of fairness concerns than he doesn＇t,which will increase the amount of recycling waste products of the closed-loop supply chain system,and will be beneficial to resource recycling and environmental protection.At the same time,it is found that the behavior of fairness concerns is an effective means for retailer to obtain the gains distribution of the closed-loop supply chain.

关 键 词：闭环供应链 公平关切 STACKELBERG博弈 定价策略 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]