基于有限理性重复博弈理论的碳配额分配机制研究  

On Carbon Quota Distribution on a Limited Rationality Repeat Game

作　　者：蒋晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学深圳研究生院,广东深圳518055

出　　处：《开放导报》2013年第3期18-35,共18页China Opening Journal

摘　　要：在分析欧洲碳交易体系祖父制分配方法的基础上,本文以博弈论作为不完全信息条件下设计碳配额分配机制的理论基础,立足于深圳碳交易体系的实际情况,应用有限理性重复博弈理论,对深圳制造业碳配额分配进行了机制设计和实验设计,希望能为我国碳排放交易体系配额分配机制的发展提供参考。Based on the analysis of grandfather allocation method and its meaning in the European Union carbon emission trading system, this paper discusses the approach to make the calculation and distribution of manufacturing carbon allowance. The game theory is proposed as the theoretical basis to design allocation mechanism under the incomplete information condition. According to the situation of Shenzhen, the theory of bounded-rationality repeated game is applied to make the mechanism and experiment design of manufacturing allowance allocation for Shenzhen carbon emission trading system.

关 键 词：有限理性 重复博弈 制造业 碳配额 分配机制 

分 类 号：X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]