双寡头市场中的个性化定价研究  

Personalized pricing in a duopoly market

作　　者：闻中[1] 梁怡 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084 [2]Tepper School of Business,Carnegie Mellon University

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2013年第6期1402-1410,共9页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70890082,70871068);清华大学自主科研计划(20101081741)

摘　　要：论文研究了双寡头竞争市场中的个性化定价策略和对产品价格和企业利润的影响.研究发现,无论是短视消费者,还是有预见性的战略性消费者,个性化技术都能够给拥有较多忠实顾客的厂商增加利润.同时,如果两厂商忠实顾客数量相差不大,无论消费者是何种类型,个性化技术也可以提高拥有较少忠实顾客的厂商的利润;但如果两厂商忠实顾客数量相差较大,个性化技术会减少拥有较少忠实顾客的厂商的利润.此外,在战略性消费者市场,相对于短视消费者市场,个性化技术能提高拥有较少忠实顾客的厂商的利润的参数空间更小.The paper studied personalized pricing strategies in a duopoly market. The result shows that for either myopic or strategic consumers, personalized pricing increases the profit of the firm with a larger loyal consumer base. If the sizes of the loyal consumer bases are not too different, personalized pricing also increases the profit of the firm with a smaller loyal consumer base. However, if the sizes of the loyal consumer bases are much different, personalized pricing decreases the profit of the firm with a smaller loyal consumer base. In addition, in a strategic consumer market, compared to a myopic consumer market, the parameter space that allows the firm with a smaller loyal consumer base to benefit from personalized pricing is smaller.

关 键 词：个性化定价 寡头竞争 博弈论 

分 类 号：F713.50[经济管理—市场营销]