捐赠行为、政府干预与代理效率  

Donation Behavior,Government Intervention and Agency Efficiency

作　　者：梅波[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆三峡学院会计系,重庆404100

出　　处：《商业研究》2013年第6期108-113,共6页Commercial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目;项目编号:71262006;教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目;项目编号:12YJC790141;教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目;项目编号:10YJC790279

摘　　要：本文分析了公司捐赠行为对代理效率的作用机理,发现捐赠支出越多越能缓解现金流用于管理者利己效用支出,代理效率越高、政府干预越少则市场化进程更高、代理效率越高;比较而言,政府干预少的地区企业捐赠支出更能提高代理效率,衰退期行业中同样的捐赠支出提升代理效率的功效有限;规模较小组中捐赠行为更容易被市场识别,规模较大组中捐赠行为更多地被视为一种社会责任。因此,捐赠支出有助于缓解自由现金流代理成本,有助于公司代理效率的改善;现实中捐赠减少现金流的同时提高了公司的代理效率和声誉,利于当前或未来公司价值的提升。This paper analyzes the mechanism of donation behavior on agency efficiency. We find： donations can ease the cash flow for managers＇ egoistic utility expenditures, the higher agency efficiency and the less govemment interven-tion, the higher marketization process and agency efficiency; compared with higher degree of government intervention, donations improving agency efficiency more is in lower degree of government intervention. Compared with the growth and mature industry, recession industry does not improve agency efficiency with same donation behavior. Donation behavior is identified more easily by market in small firms and is seen as a social responsibility in big finns. Therefore, the donation expenditure helps alleviate agency costs of free cash flow, and improve agency efficiency of corporate; in reality, while lessening cash low, donation improves also agency efficiency and reputation, benefiting the enhancement of the current or the future corporte value.

关 键 词：捐赠行为 政府干预 行业周期 代理效率 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]