我国新能源汽车研发补贴的博弈研究  

A Research of R&D Subsidies for New Energy Vehicles Based on Game Theory

作　　者：王海啸[1] 缪小明[1] 

机构地区：[1]西北工业大学管理学院,西安710072

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第6期29-32,共4页Soft Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL040)

摘　　要：尝试建立政府与企业之间的博弈模型,分析新能源汽车发展过程中政府与企业就补贴问题而进行的博弈。研究结果显示:新能源汽车发展水平不同的企业在获取补贴过程中采取的策略不一样;在实际博弈过程中信息的不对称增加了企业策略性获取补贴的动机,对新能源汽车的发展带来了负面影响。针对研究结果为新能源汽车产业政策的制定提出了建议。This paper attempts to establish a dynamic game model between the government and enterprises, and analyzes the subsidies game between government and enterprises for new energy vehicles. The result shows that： first, the strategies adopted by different enterprises in the process of access to subsidies are not the same; secondly, in the actual game process the asymmetry of information increase the motivation of enterprises strategic acquisition of subsidies, and bring a negative impact on the development of new energy vehicles. At last, the paper makes suggestions for policy-making of the new energy automotive industry based on the results.

关 键 词：新能源汽车 补贴 博弈论 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]