上市公司财务困境与银行贷款动态调整  

Financial Distress and Bank Loan’s Dynamic Adjustment of Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：沈红波[1,2] 刘烨[3] 张广婷[4] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学金融研究院 [2]清华大学金融系 [3]南京大学工程管理学院 [4]复旦大学经济学院

出　　处：《投资研究》2013年第4期34-46,共13页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金“政府干预与银行贷款监督的有效性研究”(项目编号:71102016);教育部人文社会科学研究项目“信用卡市场中的信息不对称与消费者行为研究”(10YJC790212)资助

摘　　要：本文从事后的角度研究企业出现财务困境后银行贷款的动态调整。实证研究发现:(1)银行的事后监督主要通过调整长期借款实现;(2)银行调减困境公司的长期借款,对国有和民营公司的调减幅度差异不显著,国有企业在陷入困境当年有一定的信贷优惠,但是随着时间的推移优惠逐渐消失;(3)长期借款的调整是一次调整,而不是逐年调整,且调整的方向和幅度与公司财务指标显著相关;(4)长期借款调增的困境公司,其EBIT增长率明显高于调减或调平的公司。本文的研究结果表明,对首次陷入财务困境的公司,我国银行通过调整长期借款增强了对债务人的约束,已发挥其相应的公司治理作用。This paper discusses the dynamic adjustment of distressed firms＇ bank loans in an ex post perspective, and our empir- ical study finds that： （1）The post-supervision of Chinese commercial bank is carded out mainly through the adjustment of long-term loans; （2）Banks reduce the long-term loans of distressed companies, and such adjustment doesn＇t differ significantly from state-owned to private companies;（3）Adjustments of long-term loans are made once instead of year-by-year, having a sig- nificant correlation with financial indicators; （4）Distressed companies with their long- term loans reduced or unchanged get a lower rate of EBIT growth compared with those getting increased long-term loans support. In conclusion, for companies falling in financial distress for the first time, adjustment of long-term loans enhances Chinese commercial banks＇ constraint over debt- ors and plays a correspondent role in corporate governance.

关 键 词：财务困境 银行贷款调整 监督效率 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]