我国债权人参与上市公司债务治理研究——基于现实经验数据的分析  

A Study of Creditors Participating in Debt Governance of Listed Companies in China

作　　者：苏玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]新疆财经大学,新疆乌鲁木齐830012

出　　处：《新疆财经大学学报》2013年第2期39-47,共9页Journal of Xinjiang University of Finance & Economics

基　　金：新疆维吾尔自治区科技厅软科学项目"新疆上市公司控股股东资产注入实证研究"(项目编号:201242179)

摘　　要：国外对债权人参与公司债务治理的相关研究及实践已经取得了一定的成果,而我国就此问题的研究仍然存在分歧。本文结合上市公司内、外部治理因素对债权人参与上市公司债务治理的治理效应进行分析。研究认为:债权人监督具有抑制经理人代理成本的效应;政府控制对公司绩效产生负面效应;在对经理人代理成本的影响方面,法律制度环境与债权人监督表现为互补关系;银行监督与公司绩效呈显著负相关关系;内部治理与银行监督对公司绩效没有交互效应,第二大到第十大股东在抑制控股股东代理成本方面有治理效应,对银行监督有互补效应;债权人参与上市公司债务治理具有正向作用。因而,我国应在金融发达和市场化程度较高的地区积极推行债权人参与公司债务治理。Foreign creditors participating in the governance of corporate debt research and practice have achieved some posi tive results, while in China, the opinions on this issue remain divided. This paper, eombined with internal and external govern anee factors of listed companies, analyzes the debt governance effect that creditors participate in the governance of listed compa nies. And the conclusions are： Creditors monitoring eauses the inhibition of manager agency eosts Government control has a neg ative effect on corporate performance ; when it comes to the effect the manager agent costs, the creditor supervision and legal envi ronment are complementary; Negative correlations between ereditors supervision and corporate performance are significant; corpo rate performance, internal governance and bank supervision has no interaction, the largest shareholders, from the second to the tenth, can curb the cost of controlling shareholders agency, and play a complementary role to bank supervision; Creditors partiel pating in listed companies debt governance has a positive role and monitoring effect. Therefore, in this paper, China should ac tively promote creditor participation corporate debt governance in economic and financial＇ market in the developed areas.

关 键 词：债务治理 债权人 债权人监督 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]