风险规避型零售商的链与链竞争两部定价合同  

Two-part tariffs contract under chain-to-chain competition with risk-averse retailers

作　　者：赵海霞[1] 艾兴政[1] 马建华[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2013年第3期377-386,共10页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070)

摘　　要：以批发价格为基准,构建了需求不确定环境下两个风险中性制造商和两个排他性的绝对风险规避型零售商的链与链价格竞争模型,从制造商和零售商均实现Pareto绩效改进的双赢角度识别了两部定价合同选择的博弈均衡特征和局限性,并分析了市场需求风险、零售商的风险规避程度及产品的价格竞争对两部定价合同选择的影响.研究结论表明,当价格竞争强度相对较弱且严重依赖于需求风险和零售商的风险规避程度,则通过调节固定收费在适当范围内时,两部定价合同是实现制造商和零售商Pareto绩效均改进的占优均衡合同;当价格竞争加剧并超过特定边界值时,该固定收费均衡区域消失.With the benchmarking of the wholesale price contract, this paper developes a chain-to-chain price competition model which is defined by two risk-neutral manufacturers and two exclusive risk-averse retailers under demand uncertainty. This paper not only identifies the game equilibriums and the limitations of two-part tariffs from the aspect of the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s performance improvement, but also investigates the effect of demand risk, the coefficient of the retailers＇ risk aversion, and price competition on the choice of two-part tariffs. The results show that： when the price competition is relatively weak and strongly influenced by the demand risk and the coefficient of retailers＇ risk aversion, two-part tariffs will realize the win-win of the manufacturer＇s and retailer＇s performance improvement by adjusting the fixed fee, which contributes it to be a dominant equilibrium. What is more, the fixed fee＇s equilibrium range will disappear when the price competition is relatively fierce.

关 键 词：需求不确定 风险规避 链与链竞争 两部定价合同 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]