大股东控制和风险投资参与对盈余管理的影响——来自中小板上市企业的实证研究  

The Impact of Shareholder Control and Venture Capital on Earnings Management——An Empirical Study of SME Board of China

作　　者：徐志坚[1] 汪丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,南京210093

出　　处：《北京社会科学》2013年第3期102-109,共8页Social Sciences of Beijing

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70902006);江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2010ZDIXM016)

摘　　要：大股东控制以及风险投资能否有效抑制公司在IPO前的盈余管理行为?能否降低公司的盈余管理程度?相关方面的研究已经得到了学术界的广泛关注,但研究仍处于起步阶段,相应的研究成果较少。本文以随机抽取的2008-2009年在我国深圳交易所中小板上市的22家IPO公司为样本,通过可操控性应计利润法,运用修正的琼斯模型计量相应的盈余管理程度,对大股东控制、风险投资参与盈余管理之间的相关关系进行假设检验,最后证实了相关假设。The study investigates the relationship between shareholders and listed companies＇ behavior of earnings management prior to the IPO process in a random sample of 22 companies which went public in the SME board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 2008 and 2009, attempting to find out whether venture capital and shareholder control backed companies have lower earnings management in contrast to non-backed counterparties. We began with the method of discretionary accruals and employed the adjusted Jones model to measure the behavior of earnings management. Then we used the data to construct a multivariate linear regression model to explore the relationship.

关 键 词：盈余管理 大股东控制 风险投资 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]