零售商主导下融资服务对采购合同的影响  

The Impact of Procure Contract on Financial Services with Supply Chain under Dominant Retailer’s Control

作　　者：刚号[1] 唐小我[1] 慕银平[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第4期32-36,共5页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932005);四川省软科学项目(2009ZR0064);四川省科技支撑计划项目(2010GZ0155)

摘　　要：供应链的主导权有逐渐从上游向中下游转移的趋势,研究了零售商主导供应商从属的供应链环境下,零售商从供应商取得融资时,供应链上的上下游成员的最优决策问题。研究表明,存在最优的融资合同在零售商的效用水平不会减少的情况下,可以使得有更高信用厌恶系数的供应商参与交易,并且能使整个供应链达到协调。Dominant power transferring from upstream to downstream becomes the trend gradually,this paper research the optimal decision of upstream and downstream members under financing from manufacturer with retailer’s dominance.The results show that retailer can make the deal with manufacturer with higher credit-aversion under the financing contract that maintains supply chain coordinated and keeps the same utility level to retailer.

关 键 词：零售商主导 资金约束 融资服务 协调 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]