管理者持股能缓解代理冲突引发的公司并购行为吗  

Can Executive Equity-Based Compensational Share Mitigate Agency Conflicts in Corporate M&As

作　　者：毛雅娟[1] 李善民[2] 

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院 [2]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《学术研究》2013年第6期60-68,159,共9页Academic Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71102133);教育部人文社会科学研究基金(09YJC630089);广州市哲学社会科学发展规划课题(10Q26)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在代理成本理论中,管理者持股和公司并购(或接管)都是缓解管理者与股东代理冲突的有效机制。然而,这两种机制的作用及其在我国制度环境下的实际效果,学术界的研究结论并不一致。以1999—2006年全部A股上市公司作为样本对公司并购中管理者持股缓解代理冲突的作用机理进行直接检验,结果表明:我国公司的并购行为是管理者与股东代理冲突的表现形式,而且代理成本也能显著解释连续并购频发的现象;我国管理者股权激励不足,无法对管理者的并购动机施加直接的积极影响,但管理者持股可降低企业代理成本,从而抑制管理者毁损股东价值的公司并购动机。Based upon agency theory,both executive equity-based compensation and corporate M&As are effective mechanisms of mitigating the agency conflicts existing between managers and shareholders.However,academia has not reached a consistent conclusion on their effects and actual outcomes under China ’s institutional environment.This paper uses a sample of all listed companies during 1999-2006,employs hierarchical regressions and discrete dependent variable models,such as logistic regressions and negative binomial regressions,and conducts a direct study on the functional mechanism through which executive shareholdings alleviate agency conflicts in corporate M&As.The empirical evidence indicates that China ’s M&As are virtually motivated by the agency conflicts and higher agency costs significantly result in more sequential M&As.The paper also finds that executive equity-based compensation has no direct impact on managers ’ M&A motives due to insufficient equity incentives,but the functional mechanism of the executive shareholdings are likely to be more complicat ed and implicit.That is,executive shareholdings alleviate the agency costs caused by agency conflicts and then restrain the managers’ motives of undertaking value-destruction M&A activities.

关 键 词：管理者持股 代理成本 并购 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]