控制权性质 会计稳健性与投资不足  

The Nature of Control Rights, Accounting Conservatism and Under-investment

作　　者：伍青萍[1] 郭桂花[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院,新疆石河子832003

出　　处：《山东纺织经济》2013年第6期33-36,共4页Shandong Textile Economy

摘　　要：我国资本市场制度体系尚未健全,公司投资都是在这不完善的环境下进行的,严重的信息不对称和代理问题致使公司普遍存在投资不足,而会计稳健性是会计信息质量特征之一,它具有会计信息的治理功能,即能有效缓解信息不对称和代理问题,可改善公司投资不足。当然我国的特殊制度和市场背景造成上市公司广为诟病的一股独大、所有者缺位的所有权结构,因此结合我国特殊控制权性质,研究会计稳健性与投资不足的关系。China＇s capital market system is not perfect, the company does investment in this imperfect environment. Companies have widespread underinvestment because of asymmetric information and agency problem. Accounting conservatism is one of the characteristics of accounting information quality, and it has governance functions. Accounting conservatism is effective in alleviating asymmetric information and agency problems, which can improve underinvestment. As Chinese special system and marketing background cause ownership structure that is only one big share and the absence of owners. So this paper analysises the relationship between accounting conservatism and underinvestment in China＇s special nature of control rights.

关 键 词：控制权性质 会计稳健性 投资不足 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]