供应链单委托单代理激励监督机制的建立  

Establishing Incentive Supervision Mechanism of Supply Chain Single Client Single Agent

作　　者：沈晓菲[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海电机学院高等职业技术学院,上海200240

出　　处：《上海电机学院学报》2013年第1期57-61,共5页Journal of Shanghai Dianji University

摘　　要：供应链企业间的委托代理关系,存在着信息的不对称性,必然带来道德风险。供应链中的委托人可以通过有效的激励机制,以防范供应链中代理人的道德风险,弱化代理人产生道德风险的动机;对可观察到的努力水平进行有效监督,以弱化信息的不对称性,从而减少道德风险发生的机率。Generally, there is information asymmetry in the principal-agent relation between supply chain enterprises, leading to inevitable risk of moral hazard. To prevent such moral hazard, supply chain of the principal difficult to observe effort level can be effectively incentive to weaken the agent in the motivation of moral hazard. Efforts for the observable level for effective supervision should be made in order to weaken the information asymmetry and reduce moral hazard.

关 键 词：供应链 单委托 单代理 激励监督机制 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]