生鲜品物流外包中服务商保鲜努力的关系契约激励机制  

Relational Incentive Mechanism for Fresh-keeping Effort of Service Providers in Fresh Logistics Outsourcing

作　　者：宋寒[1] 贲可蒙[1] 丁雪峰[2] 代应[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆理工大学工商管理学院,重庆400054 [2]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443002

出　　处：《物流技术》2013年第6期118-120,153,共4页Logistics Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630247)

摘　　要：针对生鲜品物流外包中服务商的保鲜努力行为和绩效都难以验证、客户和服务商均存在道德风险的问题,构建关系契约激励机制,研究了机制的实施条件,得到了最优关系契约,在此基础上分析了外生变量对关系契约实施条件及最优关系契约的影响。研究表明,当折现系数足够大,客户对未来的收益重视程度高时,关系契约能激励服务商保鲜努力,且临界折现系数和此时最优收益共享系数为保鲜努力产出系数的增函数,是风险规避度、成本系灵敏、方差的减函数。Freshness of the fresh products is one of the critical factors having an impact on the uhimate sales price. It is difficult to verify the behaviors and performance of fresh-keeping effort of the service providers in logistics outsourcing, which can result in double moral hazard. Accordingly, we established the relational contract incentive mechanism and studied the prerequisite in its implementation, deriving the optimal relational contract. At the end, we analyzed the influence of the exogenous variables on the prerequisites in implementing the relational contract and on the optimal relational contract.

关 键 词：关系契约 激励机制 生鲜物流外包 保鲜努力 

分 类 号：F252[经济管理—国民经济] F224