盈余管理与创业板公司IPO前后的业绩变化  

Earnings Management and Performance Change before and after IPO in Listed Companies on GEM

作　　者：潘端莲[1,2] 杨有红[2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]北京工商大学商学院,北京100048

出　　处：《北京工商大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第3期65-72,共8页JOURNAL OF BEIJING TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS UNIVERSITY:SOCIAL SCIENCES

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(11BGL020);北京市教育委员会科研基地-科技创新平台-跨国资本运营与会计准则趋同研究基地(PXM2012_014213_000036);北京市教育委员会科研基地-科技创新平台-中国企业集团发展研究基地(PXM2013_014213_000039)

摘　　要：对我国创业板公司IPO过程中的业绩变化和盈余管理行为进行了研究,发现"新股发行之谜"也存在于我国创业板上市公司IPO中,创业板上市公司IPO前后均进行了盈余管理,包括应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理。相对应计盈余管理,真实盈余管理对我国创业板上市公司IPO后业绩的负面影响更为严重。真实盈余管理活动偏离了公司最优化决策,损害了公司的长期利益。因此,建议监管部门可以设置创业板差别化的准入标准,并适时推出注册制,继续完善我国创业板市场的退市制度,建立投资者保护制度。A study is made on the performance change in the process of IPO in China＇ s listed companies on GEM and earn- ings management behaviors. It finds that the ＂ New Issuance Mystery＂ also exists in the IPO of China＇ s listed companies on GEM, with earnings management conducted both before and after IPO, including accrued and real earnings management. Com- pared with accrued earnings management, real earnings management has a more serious negative effect upon the performance after IPO in China＇ s listed companies on GEM. Real earnings management activities deviate from the optimization of decision-making, which has hurt the company＇ s long-term interests. Therefore, this paper proposes that the regulators should set up the differentia- ted access standards on GEM and launch the registration system in appropriate time to continue improving China＇ s delisting sys- tem on GEM and build up the investor protection system.

关 键 词：创业板公司 IPO 盈余管理 业绩变化 

分 类 号：F275.2[经济管理—企业管理]