市场化进程、终极股东控制与掏空行为  

Market Development,Ultimate Shareholder Control and Tunneling

作　　者：汪益清[1] 刘际陆[1] 

机构地区：[1]台州学院会计系,浙江台州318000

出　　处：《石家庄经济学院学报》2013年第3期85-89,共5页Journal of Shijiazhuang University of Economics

基　　金：浙江省哲学社会科学重点研究基地项目(12JDJS03YB);台州市社科联重点项目(12YZ01)

摘　　要：产权制度、法律保护等市场化进程可以减少控制权的私人收益,降低控股股东对小股东的利益侵害。以2007年—2010年沪深A股3 017家上市公司为样本,研究了市场化进程中的政府干预、产品市场发育和法制环境对控股股东掏空行为的影响。研究发现,上市公司所在地区的市场化进程越高,即政府干预程度越低,产品市场发育程度越好,法制环境越好,控股股东的掏空行为越少。The market development of property and law can reduce the private benefit of control right, thus reduce infringement of controlling shareholder on minority shareholder. We take 3107 listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2010 as the research samples to analyze the effect of government intervention, product market and legal environment on tunneling of controlling shareholder. The results show that the more is the development of market, which refers to fewer intervention of government, the better are the development of product market and legal environment, and the less is the tunneling of controlling shareholder.

关 键 词：市场化进程 终极股东控制 掏空行为 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]