CSR行为管理中政府与核心企业的进化博弈模型分析  

An Analysis of Evolutionary Game Model on CSR Management between Government and Core-Enterprises

作　　者：高学贤[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(华东)经济管理学院,山东青岛266555

出　　处：《北京交通大学学报（社会科学版）》2013年第3期66-72,共7页Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172080)

摘　　要：由于对企业是否履行CSR(Corporate Social Responsibility)行为进行监督需要可观的监督成本,且对政府来说,严格的监督还可能对短期内GDP政绩指标表现造成不利影响。因此,在缺乏媒体监督的社会环境中,政府和核心企业都有不采取措施监督供应链成员履行CSR的动机。针对这一现实问题,可运用进化博弈理论,在前人研究基础上引入GDP政绩和媒体监督的环境因素,构建政府和核心企业CSR监督的进化博弈模型,对彼此博弈策略的稳定性进行分析。研究表明:政府和核心企业对供应链成员的CSR行为是否进行监督一方面取决于监督成本、公众的CSR意识、GDP政绩指标权重以及社会媒体的监督力量等因素,另一方面也与博弈对手的策略选择的概率相关。It is costy to monitor whether supply chain member practice CSR and the supervision requires extra costs for government and strict supervision may also adversely affect GDP perfor-mance indicators in the short term. Therefore, in an environment which lacks necessary media su-pervision, both government and core-business have no strong intention in taking steps to supervise whether the supply chain members are practicing CSR. To solve this problem, we propose an evolutionary game model which takes factors of GDP performance and media supervision into ac- count on the basis of predecessors＇ study and analyzes the evolutionary stability of the game strategies. As is shown, whether government and core-enterprises carrying out their monitor re-sponsibility rests with, on the one hand, supervision cost, public awareness of CSR, weights of indicators of GDP performance and the power of social media, and on the other, the strategy probabilities of the opposite side in the game.

关 键 词：企业社会责任 进化博弈 政府监督 GDP 核心企业 

分 类 号：F270-05[经济管理—企业管理]