《纯粹理性批判》中的“对象之谜”——从现象学的视角看  

The "Puzzle of Object" in Critique of Pure Reason from the Perspective of Phenomenology

作　　者：张志伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学哲学院

出　　处：《世界哲学》2013年第4期5-17,160,共13页World Philosophy

摘　　要：按照康德的先验哲学,物自身不是认识的对象,通过感性直观被给予我们的不过是杂多表象,由杂多表象而形成知识乃至形成经验所需的"综合"只能是知性的自发性功能。然而,当康德不只一次说通过感性直观一个对象被给予我们,通过知性范畴该对象被思维的时候,感性直观给予我们的对象是什么对象?感性直观所给予的对象与知性范畴所认识的对象如何可能是同一个对象?这就是我所说的"对象之谜"。本文试图从现象学的角度解开这个谜,围绕关于《纯粹理性批判》之范畴演绎的分析,说明知性范畴不仅构成了知识的先天条件,同时也构成了经验对象的先天条件。According to Kant's transcendental philosophy,thing in itself is not the object of knowing.In Kant's view,through sensual intuition only the magnitude can be given to us,and it is by means of the spontaneous function of understanding that knowledge as well as the ' synthesis' required by the composition of experience can be constituted on the basis of the magnitude.However,when Kant points out several times that an object is given to us through sensual intuition,and the object can be thought through categories of understanding,what kind of the object given by sensual intuition is referred to?How is it possible that the object given by sensual intuition is identical with the object known by categories of understanding? That is the problem I call the 'puzzle of object',and,in this article,I attempt to solve the problem from the perspective of phenomenology.Centering on the analysis of categorical deduction in Critique of Pure Reason,I want to explain that categories of understanding constitute not only the transcendental condition of knowledge,but also that of the object of experience./r/n

关 键 词：经验 知识 对象 先验想像力 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]