零售商主导供应链中考虑供应商公平偏好的VMI模型  

Vender Managed Inventory Model Considering Supplier's Fairness Preference in Supply Chain with Dominant Retailer

作　　者：赵道致[1] 吕昕[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理学院,天津300072

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第3期45-52,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771073;71072155);天津市高等学校科技发展基金计划项目(201021127)

摘　　要：将公平偏好引入传统VMI模型之中,探讨供应商的公平偏好对供应链各成员及整体产生影响的机理。通过建立主导零售商与供应商间的Stackelberg博弈,揭示了公平偏好起作用的边界条件,研究指出:1)存在一个价格阀值,使得当产品的销售价格高于(低于)该阀值时,供应商产生(不产生)公平负效用;2)阀值的高低与零售商的渠道力量呈正相关关系;3)当销售价格高于阀值时,供应商的公平负效用会随自身嫉妒心理强度的增强而先减小后变大;4)供应商的公平偏好会加剧供应链内的双重边际效应。最后,数值分析验证了结论的有效性。By making an introduction of fairness preference into the traditional VMI model, the mechanism is dis- cussed of how fairness preference impacts the performance of supply chain. Boundary conditions of fairness pref- erence are revealed by establishing a Stackelberg gaming model. It is pointed out that 1 ） there＇ s a ＇ price thresh- old＇ , and when sales price is higher（lower） than the threshold, supplier will（ won＇ t） have fairness negative utili- ty ; 2） the value of ＇ price threshold＇ has a positive correlation with retailer＇ s channel power; 3） when sales price is higher than the ＇ price threshold＇ , fairness negative utility will firstly get higher and then lower as the supplier has an increasing degree of jealousy; 4）fairness preference aggravates the double marginal effect in the supply chain. Finally, the effectiveness of conclusions has been verified by numerical examples.

关 键 词：供应链管理 公平偏好 STACKELBERG博弈 VMI模式 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]