延迟支付下损失厌恶型零售商参与的供应链运作及协调  

Operation and coordination of supply chain under delay in payment with a loss-averse retailer

作　　者：刚号[1] 唐小我[1] 慕银平[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《控制与决策》2013年第7期1023-1027,1032,共6页Control and Decision

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目(70932005);四川省软科学项目(2009ZR0064);四川省科技支撑计划项目(2010GZ0155)

摘　　要：在延期支付下研究零售商为损失厌恶型的供应链运作及协调性问题.研究表明:系统存在唯一的纳什均衡;损失厌恶型零售商在订货上可能表现得更加积极;订货量随零售商损失厌恶的加深而减少;批发价格随零售商损失厌恶的加深而增加;供应商更倾向于选择损失厌恶更小的零售商,以达到提高期望利润的目的.在协调方面,通过引入回购合同在某种程度上缓解了零售商的资金约束,同时使得供应链达到协调,而这种协调经证明是具有柔性的.This paper argues the operation and coordination of supply chain under delay in payment with a loss-averse retailer.It is indicated that the Nash equilibrium exists in decentralized decision,the loss-averse retailer is likely aggressive in ordering,the order quantity is decreases with respect to the retailer’s increasing loss-aversion,the wholesale price is increasing with respect to the retailer’s increasing loss-aversion,and the supplier is apt to choose the retailer with less lossaversion in order to improve performance.The buy-back contract that can be proved flexible maintains the coordination of supply chain under this setting.

关 键 词：延期支付 初始自有资金 损失厌恶 协调 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]