博弈论视角下的图书馆文献采购激励机制  

Incentive mechanisms for literature acquisition in library from the visual angle of game theory

作　　者：宋静思[1] 

机构地区：[1]黑龙江大学信息管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150086

出　　处：《中华医学图书情报杂志》2013年第8期50-53,共4页Chinese Journal of Medical Library and Information Science

摘　　要：运用博弈论方法分析了图书馆与采购馆员、图书馆与书商之间信息不对称产生的道德风险和逆向选择问题及其导致的图书馆信息资源质量下降、信息资源浪费和信息服务效率低下等现象,提出了针对采购馆员和书商的激励机制,以期实现文献采购市场的良性发展。Moral risk and reverse selection leading to the decreased quality of information resources, waste of infor- marion resources, and low efficacy of information service due to information asymmetry between library and acquisi- tion librarians and between library and book suppliers were analyzed using the game theory analyzing methods, and the incentive mechanisms were proposed for acquisition librarians and book suppliers in order to realize the virtuous development of literature acquisition markets.

关 键 词：信息不对称 委托代理 道德风险 逆向选择 激励机制 博弈分析 文献采购 

分 类 号：G253.1[文化科学—图书馆学]