知觉与意向性  

Perception and Intentionality

作　　者：柳海涛[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学公共管理学院,重庆400044 [2]武汉大学哲学学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2013年第4期40-43,共4页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年项目"当代西方心灵哲学中的集体意向性问题研究"(10JYC720026);国家社科基金青年项目"集体意向研究"(12CZX017);国家留学基金委(2011605518);中央高校基本科研业务费基金项目资助(CDJSK11021);重庆大学马克思主义理论自主科研项目成果(CQUMYB2012-5)

摘　　要：相对于知觉的感觉数据理论,知觉意向论具有明显的优点。但如果认为知觉经验除了意向内容外别无其他,知觉没有非表征性特征,这种过度理智化的知觉纯意向论又是明显片面的。把纯意向论的主要观点加以改进,可以发展出另一种知觉意向论:关系理论。它把对象的布局作为知觉的构成部分,进而把知觉看做是感知者和对象的一种关系状态。但关系理论需要进一步明确意识的独特性以及对象是如何引起知觉经验的。Compared with sense - datum theory, the theory of intentionality about perception has more obvious advantages. However, another version of perception intentionality theory called pure intentionality argues that perceptual experience is nothing but intentional contents, and perception has no character of non - representation. This over -intellectualization inclination is sharply unilateral. But we can develop a better perceptual intentionality theory from it which we call relational theory. This theory counts the objects as part of perception. The perception is a relational state between the perceiver and the objects. Comparatively speaking, although the relational theory is more desirable on the interpretation of perceptual intentionality than the other two, it must solve the problem of how the ob- jects cause perceptual experience.

关 键 词：知觉 意向性 纯意向论 感觉数据 关系理论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]