国际流动性:自我保险、相互保险抑或终极保险?  

International Liquidity:Self-insurance,Mutual Insurance or Ultimate Insurance?

作　　者：孙国伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《上海金融》2013年第8期3-10,116,共8页Shanghai Finance

基　　金：2011年国家社会科学基金重大项目<重构国际金融治理体系--亚洲的视角和中国的选择>(批准号11&ZD018)的部分研究成果

摘　　要：本文从国际金融体系稳定和中国的战略选择角度探讨国际流动性自我保险、相互保险和终极保险等各种形式的"国家流动性保险"的优劣得失。在对国际货币体系本质深刻剖析的基础上,本文认为以各国国际储备积累或货币国际化为特征的"自我保险"战略以及以建立货币互换和稳定基金为手段的"相互保险"方案,既无法解决系统性的流动性冲击和国际货币体系治理困境,也不符合中国的现实利益。本文认为承认并确立美联储的国际"最后贷款人"角色,并以此构建基于共同代理理论的委托代理框架下的多边国际货币体系治理机制,可以实现国际货币体系的高效稳定和各国流动性的"终极保险"。From the perspective of the stability of international financial system and China's strategic choice,the article explores the pros and cons of all forms of 'national liquidity insurance',such as self-insurance,mutual insurance and ultimate insurance of international liquidity.On the basis of a profound analysis of the nature of the international monetary system,the article argues that both the 'self-insurance' strategy,which is characterized with the domestic accumulation of international reserves or the internationalization of domestic currency,and the 'mutual insurance',which takes the means of establishing currency swaps and stabilization funds,not only can not solve systemic liquidity shock and the international monetary system governance dilemma,but also do not conform to China's realistic interest.The article argues that to acknowledge and establish the role of the Fed as the international 'lender of last resort' and thus construct a multilateral international monetary system governance mechanism under the principal-agent framework,which is based on common agency theory,could achieve an efficient and stable international monetary system and the 'ultimate insurance' of national liquidity.

关 键 词：国际流动性 国际货币体系 消费资本资产定价模型 估值效应 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]