信息不对称下的壳公司并购对价模型  

Consideration Game Model of Shell Company Mergers Based on Asymmetric Information

作　　者：景泽京[1,2] 扈文秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安470054 [2]河南工程学院工商管理系,河南郑州450093

出　　处：《系统工程》2013年第7期15-20,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：教育部博士点基金资助项目(20096118110010);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973096)

摘　　要：在企业兼并中,信息不对称对主被并双方的价值判断和对价博弈都会产生影响。本文通过期权定价方法研究了壳资源并购中主被并双方的对价约束区间;运用对价博弈方法研究了双边信息不对称情况下的并购对价结果;运用最优停时方法研究了单边信息不对称条件下,在被并方收益最大化约束下的主并方的最优买壳时机,并分析了资本市场的平均交易价格对主被并双方并购时机和对价结果的影响;最后通过数值分析验证了主要结论,揭示了不对称信息对主并方兼并时机和对价结果的影响。The asymmetric information would affect both sides of mergers and acquisitions （M＆A） in their value judgments and consideration games. This paper explores both sides＇ constraint bounds of consideration game in Shell Resources transaction with the option pricing method, analyzed the merger price result on bilateral asymmetric information with the consideration game method, and analyzed the buyer＇s optimal merger timing on the condition of unilateral asymmetric information and maximization income of Shell Company with the optimal stopping time method, and analyzed the market Shell price＇s effect on the acquisition timing and the consideration result to both merger siders. The result shows that the buyer would advance or delay the Shell Company＇s expected merger timing according to the characteristics of shell resources.

关 键 词：管理工程 并购时机 不对称信息 期权定价 对价博弈 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学]