中国上市公司高额现金持有动机、后果及成因  

Study on Motivation,Consequence and Cause of Chinese Listed Corporation Holding High-scale Cashes

作　　者：李维安[1,2] 戴文涛[2] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116024 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2013年第8期96-104,共9页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大招标项目(10zd&035);国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL032)

摘　　要：从上市公司现金持有边际价值的视角,通过对两类代理冲突进行刻画,研究了我国上市公司高额现金持有动机、后果及价值减损的原因。研究发现,我国上市公司高额现金持有整体上存在严重的折价现象,代理理论适合解释上市公司高额现金持有行为。进一步研究发现,管理者与股东之间的代理冲突并没有显著减损公司现金持有价值,而国有控股股东与中小股东的代理冲突造成了公司现金持有价值的减损,国有控股股东控制权与现金流权的分离导致了公司现金持有价值的降低;上市公司持有高额现金的动机主要是利益侵占。This paper studies behavior,consequences and value loss reason of listed corporation holding high-scale through characterization of two kinds of agency conflict.Research finds that there is serious cash discount phenomenon on the whole in Chinese listed companies,and agency theory is more suitable to explain cash holding behavior in Chinese listed companies.Further research finds that the agency conflict between managers and shareholders does not significantly reduce the cash holding value,that agency conflict between state-owned controlling shareholders and minority shareholders lessens cash value,that separation of control rights and cash flow rights which state controlling shareholders are employing reduces corporate＇ cash holding value,that the main reason of Chinese listed companies holding large quantity of cash is out of benefit expropriation.

关 键 词：高额现金持有 代理冲突 国有控股股东 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]