企业横向兼并与Stackelberg博弈——以我国钢铁产业整合为例  

On the Horizontal Corporate Merger and Stackelberg Game——Taking the Example of Steel Industrial Integration in China

作　　者：叶旭廷[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044

出　　处：《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》2013年第8期101-108,共8页Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：企业横向兼并是提高产业集中度、实现规模经济的重要途径。本文运用Stackelberg博弈为基本模型框架,以社会福利最大化为基本目标,提出只有追随企业兼并而且成为领导企业才是有利于社会福利最大化的兼并。以全国钢铁产业整合为例,希望能为规制者的决策提供参考。Horizontal corporate merger is an important way to improve industrial concentration and realize scale economy. In this paper, with Stackelberg game being basic pattern framework, in order to realize the fundamental goal of social welfare maximization, I propose that only pursuing for corporate merger and becoming leading enterprise, can be beneficial for social welfare maximiza tion. Taking the national steel industrial integration as example, I provide reference for rule--mak- ers to make decisions.

关 键 词：横向兼并 规制者 社会福利 产业整合 

分 类 号：F272.7[经济管理—企业管理]