农户贷款中抵押与声誉机制的作用差异及贷款合约的设计  

Analysis on the Different Effects of Collateral and Reputation on Farmers' Loan and the Design of Loan Contracts

作　　者：范香梅[1] 张晓云[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南师范大学商学院,湖南长沙410081 [2]石家庄邮电职业技术学院金融系,河北石家庄050021

出　　处：《财经论丛》2013年第4期42-49,共8页Collected Essays on Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(13BJL069);教育部人文社科规划基金资助项目(12YJA790027);湖南师范大学社科青年学术骨干基金资助项目(12XGG09)

摘　　要：抵押和声誉机制在农户贷款中发挥着不同作用,实证结果表明抵押在总体上降低了农户贷款可得性,而声誉机制有助于增加农村地区的贷款。抵押贷款下,利率较低、期限较长、额度较大,且与生产性目的相匹配;声誉机制下,贷款利率较高、期限短、额度小,主要用于满足流动性和消费性资金需求。对客户信贷分层研究发现,抵押贷款适用于较富裕农户,而声誉机制贷款适用于中低收入者。The paper has found direct evidence of a negative association between collateral and the accessibility of farmers’ loans.By contrast,reputation can add the accessibility.The empirical results also show that the collateral loan which has lower interest,longer term and larger size should be used for productive purposes.However,credit loan by reputation which has higher interest,shorter term and smaller size could be used for meeting the liquidity and consuming purposes.By loan classification,collateral loan is appropriate for richer farmers,the credit loan by reputation is suitable for low-income group.

关 键 词：抵押 声誉机制 农户贷款可得性 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学]