公共餐厨垃圾回收物流中激励机制的研究  

Study on Motivation Mechanism of Public Food Waste Recycling Logistics

作　　者：王莉[1] 陈煜[1] 高静娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]石家庄铁路职业技术学院经济管理系,河北石家庄050064

出　　处：《物流技术》2013年第8期158-160,共3页Logistics Technology

基　　金：河北省社会科学基金项目"公共餐厨废弃物资源化逆向物流激励机制研究"(HB12GL069)

摘　　要：为了促使餐厨垃圾持有者积极参与逆向物流活动,通过委托-代理理论分别分析了信息对称、信息非对称两种情况下逆向物流系统中政府和餐厨垃圾持有者之间的契约关系,分析结果表明在信息对称情况下,政府可以设计较为简单的线性激励合同;在信息非对称情况下,政府可以采取试点回收,同时给予相应的激励强度,该激励强度给持有者带来的效用必须大于选择其他餐厨垃圾处理途径所获得的效用,同时要尽量降低持有者回收餐厨垃圾所付出的成本。In this paper, in order to encourage the holders of food wastes to actively participate in reverse logistics activities, we used the principal-agent theory to analyze the contractual relationship in the reverse logistics between the government and the food waste holders under information symmetry and information asymmetry respectively and argued that under information asymmetry the government should establish reclamation pilot points and at the same time provide incentive with corresponding strength which must bring more utility to the holders than any other waste treatment options they might choose and at the same time reduce the cost of the holders.

关 键 词：公共餐厨垃圾 激励机制 委托-代理理论 回收物流 

分 类 号：F713.2[经济管理—产业经济] F719.3