管理者背景特征、晋升激励与过度投资研究  

Research on Management Background Characteristics, Promotion Incentive and Over-investment

作　　者：张兆国[1] 刘亚伟[2] 亓小林[3] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院会计系 [2]华中科技大学管理学院 [3]武汉长江工商学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2013年第4期32-42,共11页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102168);教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJA630212)资助

摘　　要：本文在委托代理理论框架下,运用高层梯队理论和心理契约理论,以我国2007-2011年上市公司为样本,从管理者背景特征的角度,对晋升如何影响过度投资进行了理论分析和实证检验。结果发现,晋升对过度投资有一定抑制作用;随着年龄的增长,管理者对晋升的敏感性以及晋升对过度投资的作用均呈倒U型关系;学历越高、任期越长的管理者对晋升的敏感性越大,从而使晋升对过度投资的作用也越大。进一步区分产权性质后发现,在国有和非国有公司中,不同背景特征的管理者对晋升的敏感性以及晋升对过度投资的作用受管理者背景特征的影响均有差异。这些研究结论对我们研究晋升的作用机制和经济后果、对企业完善激励机制以及加强人力资源管理有一定的启示意义。Based on the principal-agent theory, upper echelons theory and psychological contract theory, this paper theoretically analyzes and empirically examines the relationship between the promotion incentive and over-investment from the point of view of the background characteristics of managers, using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2011. Our results demonstrate that, first, promotion restrains over-investment, and this relationship is more significance in the non-state-owned companies than in the state-owned companies. Second, there is no correlation between manager gender and promotion incentives. Moreover, manager gender does not affect inhibition relationship, that from promotion incentives to over-investment, which shows no difference between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies. Third, as managers grow older, both the sensitivity of managers in pro- motion incentives and inhibition affect from promotion incentives to over-investment show an inverted U-shaped relationship, which exhibit no significant effects in the non-state-owned companies. Fourth, Managers with higher education degree show greater pro- motion sensitivity, which lead to greater inhibition of promotion to over-investment. However, this relationship shows significant dif- ference between state-owned companies and non-state-owned companies, namely, this positive relationship between education back- ground of managers and promotion incentives is more significant in state-owned companies. However, the factor of manager education only has a significant positive effect on inhibition from promotion to over-investment in non-state-owned companies. Fifth, the factor of manager tenure has a significant positive effect on both the sensitivity of manager promotion and inhibition from promotion incentives to over-investment, which is more significant in non-state-owned companies than in the state-owned companies. The main contribution of this paper is revealing mechanism of how promotion affects corporate performance, while c

关 键 词：管理者背景特征 企业产权性质 晋升激励 过度投资 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济] F224