家族控制、职业化经营与公司治理效率——来自CEO变更的经验证据  

Family Control, Professional Management and Corporate Governance Efficiency:Evidence from CEO Turnover in Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：陈德球[1,2] 杨佳欣[3] 董志勇[4] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际财务与会计研究中心 [2]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院 [3]中央财经大学经济学院 [4]北京大学经济学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2013年第4期55-67,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71102076);对外经济贸易大学优秀青年学者培育计划(13YQ03)资助

摘　　要：本文以2002-2008年上市公司为研究样本,从CEO变更的视角,考察了家族控制和职业化经营特征对不同类型家族企业公司治理效率的影响。研究发现,由于家族所有权与管理层的分离以及家族控制对管理层的有效监督,相对于非家族企业和家族CEO企业,在职业经理人担任CEO的家族企业中,代理问题较低,CEO变更与公司业绩之间具有较强的敏感性,公司治理效率较高。家族职业化治理效率的实现机制主要是所有权监督和董事席位控制。进一步研究发现,在公司较差的经营业绩期间,CEO变更决策所导致的代理问题会影响公司价值。上述研究结论说明,在CEO变更的情境中,家族控制特征降低职业化经营的家族企业中的代理问题,加重家族成员担任CEO的企业中的代理问题。This article investigates the effect of family control and family professionalism on agency problem and corporate governance efficiency among family firms whose CEOs are family members, family firms with professional CEOs, and non-family firm from a CEO turnover perspective using data of 2002-2008. We find that whether family businesses have a serious agency problem depends on the types of family business. In family firms with professional CEO, family control can alleviate the first agency problem between shareholders and management. Professional CEO family firms have higher CEO turnover-performance sensitivity than fam- ily firms managed by family members （i.e., family CEO firms） or non-family firms. Family CEO firms increase the second agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and decrease the sensitivity of CEO turnover-performance. Compared to the professional CEO family firms, non-family firms have a severe first agency problem. The mechanism of the effect of family control on agency problem is family ownership and family board seats control, which not only strengthen the family monitor mechanism in professional CEO family firms, but also increase the corporate governance efficiency. We further find that when the corporate performance is poor, the agency problems from CEO turnover affect the corporate value in both family firms managed by family members and non-family firms are more pronounced and their firm value is lower, relative to family firms with professional CEO. Professional CEO family firms have higher corporate governance premier than family firms managed by family members （i.e., family CEO firms） or non-family firms. These results indicate that family control have a significant effect on the agency problem. which can alleviate the agency problem between management and shareholder in professional family firm, increase the agency problem between larger shareholder and minor shareholder in family firm managed by family members. Corporate governance effectivene

关 键 词：家族控制 职业化经营 公司治理效率 CEO 经验证据 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]