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出 处:《工业工程》2013年第4期14-19,共6页Industrial Engineering Journal
基 金:江苏省教育厅高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2013SJB6300030);江苏理工学院基础及引用基金资助项目(KYY12050)
摘 要:为解决多成员参与的专利授权型闭环供应链定价决策问题,利用博弈论研究了由一个原制造商、两回收制造商和两零售商构成的三级闭环供应链系统。结果表明:再制造节约成本的提高将提高单位专利许可费,而再制造率的提高会降低单位专利许可费。集中决策下供应链的整体利润高于分散决策。提出零售商收益共享、回收制造商费用分担的协作机制实现了供应链的整体协调。A three-level patent licensed closed loop supply chain system composed of one original manufacturer, two recover manufacturers, and two retailers is addressed in this paper. For such a supply chain system, based on the game theory, the pricing problem is studied. Result shows that the increase of saving cost results in the increase of unit patent license fee, while the increase of reproduction rate results in the decrease of unit patent license fee. Also, in sense of operation efficiency, centralized decision making is better than decentralized decision making. Finally, a revenue and expense sharing contract (RAESC) is proposed to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain.
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