广告主异质下的关键词拍卖的最优保留价研究  

Optimal Reserve Price of Keyword Auctions with Heterogeneous Advertisers

作　　者：王平[1] 张玉林[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京211189

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2013年第4期608-612,共5页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171046)

摘　　要：在所有参与者风险中性、竞价者估价独立及广告商私人估价异质的假设下,研究了搜索引擎的最优关键词保留价问题。借助单物品拍卖成果,设计了一个搜索引擎关键词拍卖机制,得到了关键词最优保留价满足的理论表达式。这是对已有成果的推广,且对于与广告位置和广告主相关的点击率是否满足可分离假设并不影响该结论。研究还发现,在广告主的估价独立同分布且保留价提高时,广告主获得广告位的概率降低,这也意味着搜索引擎只有选择适当的保留价来保证广告主的参与,才能保障自身收益。The optimal keyword reserve price of search engine was studied under the assumption of risk neutral, independent bidders and advertiser asymmetric private evaluation. With the results of single item auction, an auction mechanism was designed for the search engine, and a theoretical expression was obtained for the optimal reserve price. The study also found that when the advertisers＇ valuations were independent and identically distributed, the probability with which the advertiser obtain the slot would be lower with the increase of reserve price. This means that the search engine must choose appropriate reserve price to guarantee the advertisers＇ participation so that his own profit is ensured.

关 键 词：关键词拍卖 非对称估价 保留价 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理] F724.59[经济管理—国民经济]