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机构地区:[1]南京航空航天大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210016 [2]南京工程学院经济管理学院,江苏南京211167 [3]南开大学经济学院,天津300071
出 处:《物流技术》2013年第7期366-369,484,共5页Logistics Technology
基 金:江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目"资金约束供应链中融资优化与营运管理协同决策研究"(2013SJD630024);南京工程学院创新基金项目"基于信息成本约束的供应链融资优化决策理论及应用研究"(CKJ2011008)
摘 要:研究了二级供应链中制造商和零售商的联合经济批量协同决策问题,提出了延迟支付激励契约的信用期区间范围及双方有目标利润情形下信用期的设定,并且对延迟支付和数量折扣契约机制进行了比较分析,得出形成供应链协同的两种契约机制等价的条件。研究结果表明,当制造商比零售商拥有更好的投资机会时,制造商将更愿意给零售商提供数量折扣激励,此时供应链实现的总利润更高;反之,制造商则更愿意向零售商给予延迟支付激励,此时供应链实现的总利润更高。In this paper, we studied the joint EOQ collaborative decision problem of the manufacturer and retailer in a two-echelon supply chain and proposed the range of the credit term in deferred payment motivation contract as well as the setting of the credit term where both sides had profit objective. Then we compared the mechanism of deferred payment and quantity discount contract, obtained the conditions for the two supply chain collaboration mechanisms to have equal effect and found that when the manufacturer has better investment opportunities than the retailer, it would be more willing to provide quantity discount incentive to the retailer to realize higher total profit for the supply chain; where the opposite was true, the manufacturer would be more willing to provide deferred payment incentive.
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