专利保护与政府补贴下再制造闭环供应链的决策和协调  

Decision and Coordination Research for Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain under Patent Protection and Government Subsidies

作　　者：申成然[1] 熊中楷[1] 彭志强[2] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030 [2]重庆理工大学知识产权学院,重庆400050

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2013年第3期132-138,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871125);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(CDJXS11020007)

摘　　要：考虑在专利完善市场存在的再制造知识产权保护问题,分析了受专利保护下政府补贴回收再制造的两种机制:补贴给拥有专利的原制造商(GM机制)、直接补贴给第三方再制造商(GT机制),并建立了由第三方回收再制造的闭环供应链分散决策模型。结果表明,在专利产品再制造需要授权的情况下,两种机制下的产品销售价格、批发价格、旧产品的回收价格及回收量是分别相同的,原制造商可以通过收取专利许可费与第三方再制造商分享再制造和政府补贴所带来的收益。利用收益-费用分享契约,能够实现专利保护与政府补贴下闭环供应链的整体协调。It has been well acknowledged that the closed-loop supply chain （CLSC） and remanufacturing could reduce the burden on the environment because waste from landfills or used products are diverted and then reused. Meanwhile, it is encouraging that there is an increasing demand for remanufactured products in the market because a firm can obtain enormous social and economic benefits. However, in many cases original equipment manufacturers （OEMs） do not engage in the remanufacturing option after considering remanufacturing cost or other factors, while the third-party remanufacturers are attracted by the remanufacturing margins. However, in the patent perfect market OEMs are protected by patent products and own the exclusive right to remanufacturing. Only after the original manufacturer＇s patent licensing can the third-party manufacturers remanufacture used products. In addition, government subsidies can motivate manufacturers to participate in the recycling of old products. However, the current literature only considers the impact of government incentive mechanisms, but ignores the intellectual property protection of remanufacturing of patented products. Different from previous studies, this paper investigates the patent licensing and government subsidies in the patent perfect market in the condition that OEMs authorize the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture goods. Firstly, the paper analyzes two different strategies for government to subsidize the remanufacturing of used products under patent protection, OEMs of the patented products （GM mechanism） and the third-party manufacturer （GT mechanism）. In addition, the closed-loop supply chain＇s realized model is established so that OEMs can authorize the third-party remanufacturer to remanufacture used product. The results show that sales price, wholesale price, cost, and amount of used products are the same under the two mechanisms when the patented product remanufacturing requires OEMs＇ authorization. OEMs and the third-party manufacturer

关 键 词：闭环供应链 再制造 专利许可 政府补贴 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]