自我的本己性质及其发展阶段——一个来自胡塞尔时间现象学手稿的视角  

The Nature and Evolution of Husserl's Concept of “I”:Viewed from His Manuscripts of Phenomenology of Time

作　　者：方向红[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学哲学系

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期25-33,共9页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：国家社科基金重点项目"现象学运动研究"(13AZX015)阶段成果

摘　　要：胡塞尔发现的意识的"时间视角"现象以及提出的"关系中心说"证明了自我的确凿无疑的存在,范畴直观的方法和时间现象学的思路让胡塞尔不仅"把捉"到自我,从而把自我从意识流、意向对象、对象自我、身体以及意识行为中区分出来,而且还为自我本身的展开问题及其"原自我"、"自我"和"我们"三个阶段的划分带来了现象学的洞见。The phenomenon of ＂perspective of time＂of consciousness discovered by Husserl and the theory of ＂center of relations＂put forward by him demonstrate the undoubted being of＂I＂.The method of categorical intuition and the thinking way from the phenomenology of time let Husserl not only ＂grasp＂＂I＂and therefore distinguish＂I＂from the stream of consciousness,intentional objects,objectified ＂I＂,body and acts of consciousness,but also shed phenomenological insights onto the problem of the development of ＂I＂and its division into three phases as ＂primary I＂,＂I＂and ＂we＂.

关 键 词：胡塞尔 原自我 自我 时间现象学 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]