胡塞尔与康德的先验观念论  

Husserl's and Kant's Transcendental Idealisms

作　　者：李云飞[1] 

机构地区：[1]南方医科大学马克思主义学院

出　　处：《南京师大学报（社会科学版）》2013年第4期34-41,共8页Journal of Nanjing Normal University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学"十一五"规划项目(09C-04);广州市哲学社会科学发展"十一五"规划项目(10Y76);教育部人文社会科学一般项目(10YJA720017)等资助

摘　　要：康德哲学试图以现象与物自体的划界超越传统的观念论与实在论之争,并以"先验观念论"标识自己独特的哲学立场,而将各种传统的实在论和观念论斥之为"独断论的"哲学。在实行了先验转向后,胡塞尔明确用康德的"先验观念论"术语标识其先验现象学,但同时将康德哲学斥之为"独断论的"哲学。在胡塞尔看来,现象学的观念论与传统的观念论和实在论之间的通常问题毫不相干,根本没有受到它们相互论争的影响。对此,胡塞尔的现象学与康德哲学在关于世界、先验自我和先天等问题上的根本分歧凸显出现象学观念论之奇崛的哲学立场。The Kantian philosophy attempts to rise above the traditional controversy between idealism and realism by distinguishing phenomenon from＂thing-in-itself＂,and identifies its unique philosophical position with＂transcendental idealism＂.However,Kant himself refuted the traditional realism and idealism,and called them ＂dogmatism＂.After making a transcendental turn,Husserl explicitly identified his transcendental phenomenology with Kant＇s ＂transcendental idealism＂,but at the same time he also dismissed the Kantian philosophy as ＂dogmatism＂.From Husserl＇s perspective,phenomenological idealism has nothing to do with the key issues between traditional idealism and realism,and it is simply not affected by their mutual controversy.In this regard,the fundamental differences between Husserl＇s phenomenology and the Kantian philosophy on the issues concerning world,transcendental ego and a priori existence highlight the marvelous philosophical position of phenomenological idealism.

关 键 词：康德 胡塞尔 世界 先验自我 先天 

分 类 号：B516.52[哲学宗教—外国哲学]