控制权防守、利益侵占与终极股东资本结构决策  

Control Rights Entrenchment、Tunneling and Capital Structure Decision of Ultimate Shareholder

作　　者：韩亮亮[1,2] 吕翠玲 

机构地区：[1]辽宁大学商学院 [2]现代公司治理与成长研究中心,沈阳110136

出　　处：《软科学》2013年第9期38-42,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71072072);教育部人文社会科学青年基金项目(10YJC630067)

摘　　要：以2002—2009年我国民营上市公司1720个观测值为样本，实证研究终极股东控制权防守和利益侵占动机对资本结构决策的影响。结果发现：终极股东控制权与资本结构显著负相关，终极股东控制权、现金流权偏离度与资本结构显著正相关；进一步考虑控制权防守和利益侵占动机的交互影响后发现，相对于高控制权、现金流权偏离度组，终极股东控制权与资本结构在低偏离度组中更敏感，相对于高控制权组，终极股东控制权、现金流权偏离度与资本结构在低控制权组中更敏感。This paper examines the control rights entrenchment and tunneling the impact of capital structure decision of ulti- mate shareholder by use of 1720 private listed companies from 2002 to 2009 in China. The result shows that the controlling rights entrenchment was negatively related to the capital structure, and the tunneling was positively related to the capital structure. Further taking the interaction of the controlling rights entrenchment and tunneling into account, it finds sensitivity of contrul rights to capital structure was more significant in the low divergence group, and the sensitivity of divergence to capital structure was more significant in the low control rights group.

关 键 词：控制权防守 利益侵占 终极股东 资本结构 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]