投资者法律保护与大股东控制下的现金股利政策  

Legal Protection of Investors and Corporate Cash Dividend Policies under the Control of Large Shareholders

作　　者：李志军[1] 徐寿福[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海第二工业大学经济管理学院,201209 [2]上海对外经贸大学金融管理学院,201620

出　　处：《上海经济研究》2013年第9期100-112,共13页Shanghai Journal of Economics

基　　金：2012年上海高校青年教师培养资助计划项目"政策干预;现金股利政策与公司价值"沪教委人[2011]26号

摘　　要：本文基于理性经济人的假设和控制性大股东利益最大化的角度,通过建立理论模型分析了终极控股股东持股比例、两权分离度和投资者法律保护程度对上市公司现金股利政策的影响,以及他们之间的交互关系,并采用我国2004-2010年A股上市公司数据进行了实证检验。本文研究发现,上市公司现金股利政策与终极控股股东持股比例和投资者法律保护程度显著正相关,且二者之间存在替代关系,即投资者法律保护程度越高,终极控股股东持股对企业现金股利支付水平的边际影响越小。Based on the hypothesis of ＂Rational Economic Man＂ and the perspective of controlling shareholders＇ benefit maximization, this paper presents a theoretical model which explores the direct and interactive impact of the share ratios and the ownership-control rights divergence of ultimate controllers and legal protection of investors on corporate dividend policies, and tests the model empirically using data of Chinese share A listed companies during the period of 2004 - 2010. The findings of this paper shows that： （1） corporate dividends are positively related the share ratios of ultimate controllers and legal protection of investors; （2） Legal protection of investors has a substitution effect on the share ratios of ultimate controllers and decreases the margin effects of the share ratios of ultimate controllers in the determination of corporate dividend policies. But there is no evidence to show that the ownership-control rights divergence of ultimate controllers should have strong influence on corporate dividend policies and the margin effects of the divergence should be influenced significantly by legal protection of investors.

关 键 词：现金股利政策 大股东控制 投资者法律保护 

分 类 号：F275.4[经济管理—企业管理]