福多和布兰顿关于概念问题的三个理论分歧  

Three Theoretical Divergences on Concept Between Fodor and Brandom

作　　者：武庆荣[1,2] 何向东[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心,重庆400715 [2]淮阴师范学院政治与公共管理学院,江苏淮安223300

出　　处：《科学技术哲学研究》2013年第5期25-29,共5页Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"福多的组合性思想研究"(SWU1309358);国家社会科学基金重点项目"现代逻辑视野的认知研究"(11AZD057)

摘　　要：福多和布兰顿均系美国当代研究概念问题的哲人,然而相同的研究兴趣并未拉近彼此的思想距离,反而起点相同而终点迥异。文章以概念问题为出发点和背景视域,通过呈现二者在概念使用之本源、概念之内容以及成功交流之诉求三个方面的歧见,对其理论实质及其合理性作一哲学反思。Fodor and Brandom are contemporary philosophers in the United States,who study concepts.However,the same interests in the studies about concepts have not narrowed down the ideological distance between them,rather,the same starting points have brought about the different endpoints.Based on the issues of concepts,the authors rethink of the essence and rationality of their theories by showing three theoretical divergences on the fundamental locus of the use of concepts,the content of concepts,and appeals of successful communication between Fodor and Brandom.

关 键 词：福多 布兰顿 概念理论 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]