企业预算松驰行为产生的动态博弈模型分析  

An Analysis of the Dynamic Game Model Resulting from Enterprise Budget slack

作　　者：熊艳[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东财经大学会计学院,山东济南250014

出　　处：《山东财政学院学报》2013年第5期88-94,共7页Journal of Shandong Finance Institute

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"国际环境下会计准则新进展对金融监管的影响及协调研究"(12CGL029)

摘　　要：企业预算管理中产生的预算松驰行为是预算副作用的主要方面,预算松驰的存在很可能是预算执行人代理成本的表现。通过对预算松驰行为产生的动态博弈模型分析,得出公司治理因素、信息披露因素、报酬方案等是影响预算松驰大小的因素,同时,预算松驰大小也与预算委托人的风险偏好等个人行为有关。Budgetary slack is the main side effect in erfterprise budget management. Budgetary slack is most probably the manifestation of agent cost produced by budget agents in essence. This paper analyzed the budgetary slack behavior through the dynamic game model. Through the analysis this article concluded that corporate governance factors, information disclosure factors, compensation programs are the factors influencing budget slack. In addition, budget slack behavior is related to the budget client＇ s risk preferences. This study provided a basis for the control of budgetary slack in budget management.

关 键 词：预算松驰 动态博弈 信息披露 公司治理 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]