内部控制、银企关联与融资约束——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Internal Control,Bank Connection and Financing Constraints——Empirical evidence from Chinese listed companies

作　　者：程小可[1] 杨程程[1] 姚立杰[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京交通大学

出　　处：《审计研究》2013年第5期80-86,共7页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71272055;71372011);教育部基金项目(B12C100020;B12CQ00020);北京交通大学基本科研业务费(B11JB00440;B12JB00300;B13JB00080)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2009-2011年沪深A股主板上市公司为研究样本,基于投资现金流敏感度视角探究了内部控制和银企关联对企业融资约束的影响效应。研究发现:高水平内部控制可以有效缓解企业所面临的融资约束问题;进一步研究发现,在缓解企业融资约束方面,高水平内部控制和银企关联之间存在一种替代机制,即银行关联企业更多地借助于银行资源来降低其融资约束水平;而非银行关联企业更多地在提高其内部控制水平,降低其与外界的信息不对称程度层面上,达到缓解自身融资约束的目的。上述发现为理解内部控制、银企关联对中国上市公司融资约束的作用机理提供了新的经验证据。Vsing companies listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange we empitically examine the impacts of internal control and ban and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2011, connection on corporate tenancing constraints from the perspective of cash flow sensitivity. We find that high level of internal control can effectively reduce corporate fi- nancing constraints. In addition, we find that good internal control and bank connection are substitutional in redwing corporate financing constraints, suggesting that bank connected firms may rely more on the unique resources reduce their financing constraints, and that non-bank connected finns reduce their financing contrains through providing in- ternal control. Our results provide new evidence in understanding the economic consequences of internal control and bank connections.

关 键 词：内部控制 银企关联 融资约束 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.4[经济管理—国民经济] F224