股权制衡、董事会制度与终极控制人掏空效应——以西藏发展为例  

Equity Restriction,Board System,and the Ultimate Controller's Tunneling Effect:A Case Study of Tibet Development Corporation

作　　者：杨小平[1,2] 常启军[1] 

机构地区：[1]桂林电子科技大学商学院,广西桂林541004 [2]西南交通大学经济与管理学院,成都610031

出　　处：《管理案例研究与评论》2013年第4期320-331,共12页Journal of Management Case Studies

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"全球金融危机下我国产业西迁与西部地区优势产业发展研究"(09XJY012)

摘　　要：基于中国投资者利益保护机制现实,本文从股权制衡、董事会制度视角展开对终极控制人掏空效应的案例研究,结论显示:西藏发展终极控制人利用大量非关联交易方式掏空上市公司;西藏发展的第二大股东为国有股权,长时期未阻止终极控制人的掏空行为;西藏发展上市公司董事会受到大股东的操控。Based on China＇s investor protection the ultimate controller＇s tunneling effect from the perspectives of equity restriction and the board system. The conclusions are as follows- the ultimate controller of Tibet Development Corpora- tion undermined the listed company with non-affiliated transactions; the second largest share- holder of Tibet Development Corporation is state-owned equity, which has failed to stop the tun- neling behavior of the ultimate controller; the board of directors of the listed company of Tibet Development Corporation is under the control of major shareholders.

关 键 词：终极控制人 股权制衡 投资者利益保护 独立董事 西藏发展 

分 类 号：C930[经济管理—管理学]