环境邻避的经济学分析  

An Economic Analysis on Environmental NIMBY

作　　者：赵志勇[1] 朱礼华 

机构地区：[1]唐山学院经济管理系 [2]广东省人口发展研究院

出　　处：《社会科学》2013年第10期60-66,共7页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"为我国合理分担国际环境责任提供依据的理论与量化研究"(项目批准号:71073085);教育部人文社会科学研究项目"生态环境问题成因与治理的政治经济学分析"(项目批准号:09YJA79011)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：近年来,中国的环境邻避事件呈多发之势,并以邻避设施的停建或异址为结局,很多时候,从经济学的角度,这并不符合经济效率的原则,存在帕累托改进,增进社会总体福利的空间。在环境邻避事件中,公众作为利益攸关方发挥了决定性的作用,政府和企业的被动而无所作为才是事件发生的关键。从环境公平的视角审视邻避设施的外部性影响,分析邻避事件中政府—企业—公众三方行为和利益关系,抓住了环境邻避问题的本质,只有改变三方收益成本函数并建构三方均衡利益关系方能减少邻避的发生,实现经济发展与环境保护的共赢。In recent years, Environmental NIMBY （Not In My Backyard ） event occurs more frequently and leads to the NIMBY facilities stopped or change location. These cases don＇t always comply with the principle of economic efficiency and there being Pareto improvement space to promote the whole welfare of the community from the economic point of view. The public as stakeholders play a decisive role in Environmental NIMBY event and government and enterprises passive inaction is to be blame. The article examines NIMBY facility＇s external influence from environmental equity perspective and analyzes government -corporate -public tripartite behavior and interests, proposes to change the tripartite benefit-cost function and construct tripartite balanced interest to reduce the occurrence of NIMBY, and thus achieves a win-win situation of economic development and environmental protection.

关 键 词：邻避 公众参与 环境公平 规制 

分 类 号：X21[环境科学与工程—环境科学] F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]