企业集团金字塔式控制结构与大股东掏空行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Business Group,Pyramidal Ownership Structure and Large Shareholder Tunneling: Evidences from Chinese Listed Companies

作　　者：王蓓[1] 姚惠宇[2] 马丽亚[3] 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学公共管理学院,北京100029 [2]中国储备棉管理总公司,北京100032 [3]河北科技大学唐山分院经济系,河北唐山063000

出　　处：《国际商务（对外经济贸易大学学报）》2013年第5期54-63,共10页INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学青年基金(项目批准号:11YJC630198);对外经济贸易大学科研课题(课题批准号:10QD06)

摘　　要：本文以2005-2008年中国企业集团及其旗下上市公司的数据为样本,探讨了企业集团、金字塔式控制结构与大股东掏空的关系。采用行业业绩冲击敏感性方法,以同属于一个集团内公司间的相对控制权为基点,研究控制性大股东利用集团内部市场进行非效率资产转移与配置的可能性与转移路径。结果显示"大股东掏空"行为在中国非常普遍,而且控制性大股东倾向于把资源从拥有较少所有权的底层公司转移到拥有较高所有权的上层公司。In many countries, controlling shareholders tunneling, sometimes in the form of transferring resources are often accused of from companies where they have few cash flow rights to ones where they have more cash flow rights. Due to the illicit nature of tunneling, however, quantifying the extent of such tun-neling proves difficult. This paper uses responses of different firms in the same group to performance shocks to map out the flow of resources within this group of firms and to quantify the extent to which the marginal dollar is tunneled. This technique is then applied to data on Chinese business groups and affiliated listed firms on 2005-2008 basis. The results suggest a significant amount of ttm- neling between firms in these groups.

关 键 词：企业集团 大股东掏空 公司治理 金字塔式股权结构 

分 类 号：F279.2[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]